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Abstract. There is a high potential for recovery mechanisms to be used to incentivise the uptake of flood mitigation 
and loss reduction measures, undertake adaptation and promote community resilience. Indeed, creating a resilient 
response to flooding requires flood risk management approaches to be aligned and it needs to be ensured that 
recovery mechanisms to not provide disincentives for individuals and business to take proactive action to reduce risk. 
However, the degree to which it is desirable and effective for insurers and governments providing compensation to 
promote resilience and risk reduction depends upon how the cover or compensation is organised and the premiums 
which are charged. A review of international flood recovery mechanisms has been undertaken to identify firstly the 
types of schemes that exist and their characteristics. Analysis of existing instruments highlights that there are various 
potential approaches to encourage or require the uptake of flood mitigation and also discourage the construction of 
new development in high flood risk. However despite the presence of these instruments, those organising recovery 
mechanisms could be doing much more to incentivise increased resilience.  
1 Introduction  
There are many ways in which those who suffer the 
impacts of flooding can financially recover from losses. 
These mechanisms can be broadly characterised by the 
level to which those who receive financial assistance, 
directly pay for the recovery mechanism and the 
formality and rigidity of the device. Widely available 
flood insurance within a well-functioning and solvent 
market has the potential to not only assist the recovery 
from hazard events; but also positively influence 
mitigation behaviour. However, the characteristics of 
current flood insurance models and their effectiveness 
vary considerably between countries. How flood 
insurance provision is structured, what losses are covered 
and excluded and how it is purchased all impact upon the 
effectiveness of the scheme for recovering from flood 
losses and ultimately how burden sharing is split between 
the at-risk individual and society. 
2 The varying roles of insurance and 
recovery 
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1. Reimbursing those who suffer damage, and thereby 
restoring them to their pre-flood financial situation. 
2. Spreading the costs of flooding across communities 
(and clients), given that floods may affect only some 
communities at a time; and for individuals through 
time by spreading the potential costs of flood damage 
over many years in relatively small payments rather 
than having a single large cost if, and when, a flood 
actually occurs.  
3. Reducing the costs to the government of post-event 
recovery since the insured will receive insurance 
funds (note: where a private insurance sector exists 
only) 
4. Promoting a change of behaviour with regard to 
exposure to flood risk, by giving a signal of the 
hazard that people face and providing incentives for 
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 
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Although a recovery mechanism can provide financial 
recompense following flooding, it is important that it 
does not act in a way which encourages an increase in 
risk and/or behaviour leads to increased damages. This 
paper therefore considers the fourth of the roles presented 
above and examines how, and the extent to which, 
different types of recovery measures can promote risk 
reduction action by individual householders, business 
owners or governments.  
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3 Methods 
Over thirty international recovery mechanisms have 
been reviewed as part of a desk-based analysis - 
supplemented by qualitative interviews - to identify the 
potential and barriers of different types of approaches. 
Analysis has focussed on not only the potential for the 
promotion of adaptation to flood risk, but also on the 
effectiveness of current approaches in delivering risk 
reduction. Before discussing potential risk reduction 
instruments it is important to briefly introduce different 
types of recovery mechanisms. 
4 Types of flood recovery mechanisms 
 Priest [2] provides a straightforward typology 
highlighting four types of flood-recovery options. This 
categorisation varies by the directness of financial input 
by the individual: 
 Loss bearing - The victim carries all of the losses. 
 Loss sharing  This involves spreading the losses 
more widely. One type of formalised mechanism is 
flood insurance. The victim contributes through 
premium payments, but does not bear the total loss. 
 Compensation  A more social device. National, 
regional or local governments provide financial 
assistance to those affected by flooding. The victim 
generally contributes through taxation, but does not 
bear the total loss. 
 Charitable/ International aid  Financial assistance 
provided through donations which may be from 
inside or outside of the area affected. The victim 
does not contribute directly to the losses. 
 
 A number of studies have aimed to model and 
categorise flood recovery, insurance and compensation 
mechanisms (notably [3, 4, 5 and 6]). The research 
presented here builds on this work, but broadens the 
discussion to encompass all types of flood recovery 
mechanisms. Figure 1 presents a categorisation of 
international recovery types. These have been divided 
according to the following criteria; whether flooding is a 
bundled risk or offered as a single peril, if insurance is 
provided or backed by the government and whether if it is 
compulsory (those in italics). Figure 2 presents 
compensation approaches divided according to: whether a 
scheme and the relevant rules are established prior to an 
event occurring or are established on an ad hoc basis and 
whether the financing of the schemes are established in 
systematic way prior to the event occurring (ex ante) or if 
funding has to be found after the event (ex post). Where a 
country has more than one type of recovery system 
available they will appear more than once in the figures. 
The figures are drawn after Table 6.5 in [7] and based on 
information in [5, 8-12].  


 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. International examples of insurance cover. 
Private market (operates on an 
individual market basis) 
Bundled with other 
perils  
State run (and subsidised)  
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, China 
Ecuador, Germany, Israel, Japan, Mexico, 
the Netherlands (rainfall and SWF), New 
Zealand, Philippines, Portugal, Sweden 
 
Australia, Denmark (non-sea 
flooding, Germany, Indonesia, 
Italy, Poland, Taiwan,  
Denmark (sea flooding), 
France, Iceland 
Pooled system (high degree of 
state involvement/ 
backing) 
Spain, Switzerland, 
(Cantonal) United States 
Pooled system (private insurance 
market led different pools e.g. 
single/bundled perils) 
Norway, Romania,  
Switzerland (GUSTAVO), 
UK (post-2016) 
Individual  
peril  
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Figure 2. International examples of compensation schemes 
 
5 The role of recovery mechanisms in 
encouraging risk reduction action  
There is a high potential for insurance cover to be 
used to incentivise the uptake of flood mitigation and loss 
reduction measures, undertake adaptation and promote 
community resilience. As Kunreuther [13; p180] argues 
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degree to which it is desirable for insurers to promote 
resilience and risk reduction depends upon how the cover 
is organised and the premiums which are charged. 
Theoretically, if individual insurers have a good 
understanding of flood risk, are able to assess the risk 
well enough to effectively price that risk and achieve 
actuarially-price premiums from customers there insurers 
would have little interest or need to be concerned about 
the degree of risk nor the need to incentivise resilience 
behaviour. However, from the international examples, 
insurance systems which satisfy these conditions remain 
limited.  
The types of exposure being covered and the nature of 
adverse natural events means that private insurers are not 
able to take on these risks alone, they are also reliant on 
other mechanisms to assist in risk management. 
Consequently, there is often the need to require the active 
involvement and agreement of other parties such as 
government agencies, building contractors and financial 
institutions to ensure that other policy tools (e.g. 
construction codes, risk reduction measures) are 
implemented [13]. Additionally, it is not only insurance 
that can contribute to risk reduction; placing requirements 
on victims receiving compensation can also be effective 
in incentivising risk reduction measures. 
There is a wide variety of ways in which flood 
mitigation and risk reduction activities may be introduced 
and at a variety of scales; from individual household level 
measures, to community resilience schemes, up to 
regional or national strategies. Insurers and insurance 
schemes may impact upon all of these levels although the 
instrument that they achieve this (e.g. lobbying 
government, placing restrictions on coverage, offering a 
reduction in premium) to incentivise mitigation can vary 
considerably. Importantly, many of the insurance or 
compensation schemes reviewed appeared to have no or 
very few measures to encourage risk reduction action. Of 
those that do, the overall uptake (penetration) of the 
approach is important as if few people have insurance or 
will receive compensation then the impact that any 
incentivising actions have will be reduced.  
Similarly, the availability of multiple flood recovery 
mechanisms in one location is important to consider in 
the context of risk reduction. There is some evidence to 
suggest that the presence of government compensation 
provides a disincentive for individuals to purchase their 
own insurance and consequently in these situations (such 
as Austria or Italy) insurance penetration is low. This will 
of course reduce the influence and effectiveness of any 
requirements that insurers might make or any incentives 
that they introduce. 
The following sections describe some of the key ways 
in recovery mechanisms incentivise risk reduction action. 
These have been identified from the review of 
international flood recovery measures and include a mix 
of measures which either incentivise or require risk 
reduction action and those that dis-incentivise living in 
flood risk areas. Importantly, the categories are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive and any one recovery 
system may have more than one of these measures to try 
to incentivise risk reduction. Table 1 provides a summary 
of the possible instruments used to promote risk reduction 
and examples of where it has been implemented. 
Flood 
compensation 
provided 
No or very little 
state 
compensation 
provided   
Australia, Argentina, Brazil, China, Denmark (sea flooding), 
Ecuador, France, Iceland, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland 
(GUSTAVO), Sweden, Taiwan, UK. 
Ex-ante 
financed 
scheme 
Ex-post 
financed 
scheme 
Ad hoc 
compensation  
Degree of pre-flood 
event planning  
Canada (most 
flooding), The 
Netherlands (sea 
and river 
flooding) 
Austria, 
Mexico, 
Belgium 
 
Australia, 
Argentina, 
Germany, 
Italy, Poland, 
United States 
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 5.1 Excluding properties from cover
Excluding properties from cover is a relatively 
common mechanism which is used to try to reduce both 
the exposure of insurance companies or compensation 
funds. A range of different types of properties were 
observed to be excluded for different reasons. The first 
category is those properties most at risk from flooding 
and for which insurers consider too risky to cover. These 
might be excluded directly with an insurer refusing to 
offer any kind of cover. Secondly, an insurer may 
increase a premium to such a high price that it becomes 
unaffordable and, as such, is indirectly excluding that 
property from coverage. This situation was observed in 
Germany where areas have been categorised by flood risk 
(ZÜRS) of which the highest (probability of flooding is 
greater than 1 in 10 years) is considered to be uninsurable 
[12, 14]. However, the non-compulsory nature of flood 
insurance in Germany means that the impact of these 
actions will be limited. Despite this, the uncertainty 
surrounding the amount of compensation that might be 
received (in Germany the approach to compensation is ad 
hoc) may be enough to incentivise those at high risk of 
flooding to take some action. 
A second category of exclusion relates to whether 
some categories of the property or contents are excluded. 
For instance, in Italy as well as some entire properties 
being excluded, there was also evidence that there are 
exclusions placed upon contents located on the ground 
floor up to a certain height (e.g. 20 or 30 cm) [10]. This 
may have the impact of incentivising the uptake of 
individual property resilience or resistance measures and 
in particular for people to take action to save contents 
(e.g. by moving it upstairs) prior to, or during, a flood 
event. 
One of the most common property types excluded 
from flood coverage is newly built homes. Linking 
closely with spatial planning, insurers and governments 
want to avoid increasing the numbers of properties at risk 
of flooding. The refusal of insurance, or not being 
entitled to premium reductions, may have the power to 
motivate some people to reduce their flood risk in order 
to try to obtain insurance. However, the degree to which 
an exclusion of insurance coverage acts as a deterrent for 
development in areas of flood risk is debatable This is 
likely to be most powerful where there is some 
compulsion to purchase insurance, including situations 
where there is the need to have insurance to secure a 
mortgage, however in other situations whereby insurance 
is optional it may have little effect. Not being able to 
secure insurance on a house may have severe 
implications including defaulting on the terms and 
conditions on an existing home loan. It may also limit the 
potential opportunities for selling the property and affect 
its resale value if potential buyers are unable to secure a 
mortgage. This condition was found in a number of 
international examples reviewed in this study; e.g. 
Belgium, Norway, Denmark, United Kingdom and 
France. In order to be most effective insurance coverage 
needs to be widespread for a significant impact. There is 
little direct and demonstrable evidence that restrictions of 
insurance cover have had a verifiable impact on the 
reduction of development in the floodplain [15]. 
5.2 Minimum standards or special conditions 
imposed on properties
A further incentive for risk reduction is through the 
placement of special conditions on policyholders if they 
wish to purchase insurance or receive compensation 
following an event. One such special condition might be 
that a householder has adopted property level resilience 
or resistance measures to reduce the susceptibility of the 
property to loss. Both Denmark and Iceland have 
inclusions within policies that if properties have been 
flooded in the past then there is the need to adopt 
preventative measures and that insurance can be reduced 
or refused if this is not undertaken [12]. However, similar 
to the Belgian situation, it is unclear how often these 
clauses are invoked and cover is actually refused. 
The most comprehensive approach which is trying to 
encourage mitigation, often through the raising of 
properties, is the National Flood Insurance Programme in 
the United States [16]. This insurance scheme has many 
conditions relating to risk reduction and communities are 
only permitted to enter the insurance scheme if they 
participate fully in complying with the requirement to 
undertake risk assessment and then further mitigation 
activities. Despite the good intentions however, due to a 
lack of enforcement and the often disputed risk 
assessment process, it is unclear the extent to which the 
NFIP has impacted positively on risk reduction [17]. This 
is one of the aspects that is hoped will be improved upon 
under the new reformed program [18].  
Building codes and special building regulations have 
often been considered to be fundamental to insurers 
reducing their risk from future losses [13, 19]. 
Unsurprisingly, insurers seemed to be most interested in 
the structural integrity of dwellings, but perhaps less 
interested in other aspects of resilient design that may 
reduce losses. There were many instances within the 
international review that made the adherence to building 
codes or construction standards a requirement for the 
availability of insurance or the receipt of financial 
recovery if flooded. It was also possible for insurance to 
be removed or refused for properties that were considered 
to be poorly constructed or poorly maintained. 
International examples which mentioned building 
regulations of this nature include Spain, Turkey, Iceland, 
Norway and Romania. However, many of these named 
schemes are for multiple hazards and the construction 
standards often were mainly concerned with the structural 
integrity to earthquakes. It was not clear if there were 
additional requirements for flood or how earthquake 
resilient properties might fair during flood events. 
Despite this ambiguity there is no reason why requiring 
certain building standards or the retrofitting of resilience 
or resistance measures might not be extended to other 
recovery schemes. However, in order to be effective for 
flooding this would need to be water-damage specific and 
go beyond many of the measures currently implemented. 
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Additionally, the issue of enforcement would also need to 
be addressed with some relatively easy and cost-effective 
ways of checking whether properties have met (or even 
exceeded) the required building standards. Any change of 
this level is likely to need government involvement and 
even regulation. 
5.3 Higher and risk-reflective premiums
In those situations where insurance is compulsory or a 
condition on a mortgage, the use of risk-reflective 
premiums (i.e. insurance premiums are highest in areas at 
highest risk of flooding) may be sufficient to incentivise 
householder actions to reduce the risk to their properties 
so that in turn they will receive a premium reduction. 
Despite this appearing to be a sensible way in which to 
price coverage, there were few international examples 
where this was working to incentivise risk-reduction 
behaviour. In general, where risk-reflective premiums 
were evident the insurance penetration was so low that it 
did not have a major impact upon the reduction of risk. 
One situation which did appear to be incentivising good 
practice was in Belgium. Newer properties built after 
September 2008 (18 months after the initiation of the 
insurance scheme) do not benefit from a governmental 
premium cap and are thus, in general, required to pay 
risk-related premiums. They are also excluded from 
receiving compensation as part of the disaster fund [12]. 
In other situations, such as the UK, where risk-
reflective premiums might have been charged the 
competitiveness of the market is such that premium levels 
are kept low and reduces incentives for individual risk 
reduction activity. The new Flood Re scheme 
implemented from April 2016 aims to change this 
situation and slowly increase premiums levels over the 
next 25 years to better reflect risk with the explicit aim of 
encouraging risk-reduction action [20]. 
5.4 Limiting the level of indemnification or the 
amount compensated
A limit on the level of indemnification offered by a 
scheme or the amount of compensation that any 
householder may receive is another way of impacting risk 
reduction activities, by introduci 
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receive recompense for all of their losses this may 
incentivise them to try to reduce their risk through the 
uptake of household level mitigation or undertake 
damage-saving activities during a flood event. There are 
a number of different ways in which recovery approaches 
may limit the amount that households may receive. The 
most common is through the application of a deductible 
which is the amount that the insurant is required to pay as 
part of a claim (might either be a set value or a 
percentage of the total loss). Deductibles have long been 
used as instruments to control moral hazard the rational 
being that if policyholders have to contribute a 
percentage of the loss before they are fully-indemnified 
then they will make efforts to reduce the overall total loss 
[21]. Most of the international examples identified in the 
review had some level of deductible, although the 
amounts were highly variable.   
High deductibles may create a larger incentive for 
property-owners to consider adopting mitigation 
measures as they will increase the amount of the total loss 
that they would have to bear and absorb following a flood 
event. Increasing deductibles, particularly in high risk 
areas, might be one way in which the cost-effectiveness 
of mitigation measures can be increased as this potential 
extra cost to the policyholder should be off-set against the 
cost of implementing mitigation. However, the extent to 
which policyholders will take notice of high deductibles 
in advance of flooding is debatable and any self-
evaluated cost effectiveness will be difficult to calculate. 
The cost to a policyholder lies in the future and is one 
that may never even occur. Therefore, an increased 
premium (which to policyholders is a tangible cost) may 
be more likely to impact upon mitigation behaviour. 
Another way for insurance or compensation schemes 
limiting their losses and/or requiring some degree of co-
bearing of loss is through limiting how much those 
affected will receive. The system in Austria is a good 
example of this whereby insurance is provided with an 
indemnification limit of 25 to 50% of the property value 
[12]. Italy also caps the level of the sum insured; in this 
case to 50% of that insured for fire [8]. In the Romanian 
system a limit is placed on the amount claimed on an 
annual aggregate basis [12]. Although this may only be 
applicable to the very highest risk properties this may 
encourage them to adopt risk reduction measures. These 
high-risk scenarios are also the instances where 
individual risk reduction measures will be most cost-
effective. A number of schemes (including both insurance 
and compensation) also have total event loss limits or 
fund limits in any one year (e.g. Belgium, Iceland, the 
Netherlands). Both of these limits will serve to increase 
the level of burden on the individual householder who 
may want or need to reduce their risk in order to reduce 
their losses following a flood. Arguably the former 
situation, whereby the limit is applied at a household 
level and therefore may also be known in advance of an 
event, maybe much more likely to incentivise action than 
those applied at the scheme level which is further 
removed from the individual. However for all limitations 
on the amount of recompense received, awareness is 
likely to remain a key issue. In order to be effective in 
incentivizing action (i.e. prior to being flooded) the 
policyholder needs to be aware of these limits and often 
commit to spending money to increase the resilience and 
resistance of their properties. 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
DOI: 10.1051/, 6E3S Web of Conferences e3sconf/201
FLOODrisk 2016 - 3rd European Conference on Flood Risk Management 
7 071700517005 ( 2016)
5
Instrument Promotion of risk reduction or adaptive FRM Examples of implementation 
High or actuarially-priced 
premiums 
 
The presence of actuarially-priced premiums 
which in high flood risk areas may be substantial 
may be sufficient to incentivise risk reduction 
measures in return for a reduction in those 
premiums 
 
Successful international examples are 
limited as penetration is often low. 
Exclusions of properties from 
insurance coverage 
 
Excluding newly built properties from cover is a 
common mechanism to try to reduce increased 
development. It may have some impact in those 
countries whereby flood insurance is compulsory 
(or whereby household insurance is required to 
secure a mortgage) however in situations whereby 
insurance is optional it may have little effect. 
 
e.g. Belgium, Norway, Denmark, 
United Kingdom and France. 
 
Little demonstrable impact that 
exclusion restrains development [24] 
 
Exclusion of all properties in the highest risk 
zones. May theory dis-incentivise the 
construction of new properties in these areas and 
incentivise other risk reduction activities for 
existing properties. 
 
e.g. Germany - properties with a 
probability higher than 1 in 10 years is 
considered uninsurable  but limited 
coverage 
Exclusions of contents from 
insurance coverage 
Exclusion of certain types or locations of contents 
 conditions placed on those contents located on 
the ground floor up to a certain height. It may 
serve to encourage resistance activities and 
especially for people to evacuate or raise 
properties before or during a flood event. 
Exclusion of certain types or locations 
of contents  conditions placed on those 
contents located on the ground floor up 
to a certain height. It may serve to 
encourage resistance activities and 
especially for people to evacuate or 
raise properties before or during a flood 
event. 
Restrictions on the level of 
indemnification and the 
percentage of the loss 
compensated. 
 
Capping the level of indemnification (thus 
limiting the amount of financial loss recovered). 
Increased burden on householder may encourage 
adoption of household level mitigation and/or 
damage saving action during an event. 
 
e.g. Austria  insurance indemnification 
is capped at 25-50% of property value 
 
Application of deductibles this is the amount that 
the insurant is required to cover. Increasing 
deductibles is one way to increase the cost-
effectiveness of implementing risk reduction. 
 
A very common element used within 
both insurance and compensation 
schemes (e.g. Belgium, France, 
Germany) 
Conditions placed in order to 
receive recovery or participate in 
an insurance scheme 
 
Placement and enforcement of special conditions 
as part of an insurance scheme or to receive 
compensation. 
 Special building regulations (e.g. floor 
heights, structural integrity). 
 Direct adoption of individual property-level 
mitigation measures. 
 
e.g. National Flood Insurance 
Programme in US  directly linking risk 
reduction and house raising to 
insurance. 
Currently, more commonly applied for 
earthquakes (e.g. New Zealand, Iceland, 
Turkey) 
Standard retrofitting following 
flood events 
 
Most direct link is through the retrofitting of 
flood resistance and resilience following an event. 
Although this seems a sensible option it rarely 
occurs in practice due to the often increased cost. 
Few ways in which this is currently offered and 
policyholders are not compelled into taking this 
action. 
 
Is offered by some insurers for instance, 
but the shortfall in cost needs to be 
borne by the insurant. 
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5.5 Retrofitting as standard following flood 
events
Another area to explore is retrofitting resilience or 
resistance into properties following flood events. There is 
the real potential for this to impact upon the risk of 
properties and any future damages. However, there was 
very little mention of this within the international 
examples investigated in this study. As mentioned 
previously, both the schemes of both Denmark and 
Iceland have provisions to refuse or limit insurance cover 
for properties already flooded if preventative measures 
are not subsequently adopted [9]. However, this does not 
appear to be integrated into the actual recovery process, 
i.e. that financial recovery received from either insurance 
or compensation are required to restore the house in a 
way that reduces any future losses.  
It may be easiest to make this a requirement where 
there are higher degrees of government intervention as it 
is often considered to be more expensive than restoring a 
property to its pre-flood condition and therefore in the 
short-term may cost more. This is problematic for private 
market insurers. Although it would be possible for them 
to invest more money and reduce the risk in these 
properties, thereby also reducing their  
 
exposure, since the majority of insurance policies are 
renewed annually they are only guaranteed this business 
for a maximum of a year in the future and therefore it is 
not cost-effective for them to make these investments.  
Affordability may be a barrier in those situations 
where the difference in cost needs to be covered by the 
individual. The Repair and Renew Grant was recently 
implemented by the UK government to try to overcome 
this obstacle and those who have been flooded can seek 
an additional £5000 following a flood event, which will 
be combined with an insurers pay out, to undertake more 
resilient repair of their property [22]. It is too early to 
really understand the success of this new approach and 
uptake when it was first implemented in 2013/14 was 
low. However, it has been reinitiated following the winter 
2015/16 floods where it is hoped to have a greater 
influence [22]. 
Affordability, however, is not the only obstacle. 
Insurers in the UK have also reported in the past other 
barriers to instigating more flood resilient or resistant 
repair following flood claims including; financial 
regulations which prohibit collective action and the 
agreement that they will adopt resilient repair as standard, 
some opposition from homeowners about the appearance 
of resilient repairs and homeowners concerns about the 
impact on the value of their property. This hesitancy 
might of course be offset in the future if property-owners 
knew that they could drastically reduce their future 
premiums or were aware that they would only be able to 
obtain insurance in the future if they undertook these 
actions 




6 Conclusions and implications 
Despite there being significant potential for some 
recovery measures to incentivise the uptake of flood 
mitigation or undertake risk reduction, evidence from 
existing recovery systems have highlighted that there are 
actually few instances where individual mitigation 
measures are effectively incentivised. Different recovery 
approaches could be doing more to integrate risk 
reduction into their core functions. Indeed, in particular 
insurers are well placed to be able to access those at risk 
and provide information. However, significant obstacles 
remain. Firstly, in many cases the promotion of risk 
reduction or adaptive behaviour is often a by-product of 
the use of the instruments in Table 1, rather than the 
central purpose. Ultimately, the core focus of many of 
these instruments is the management and reduction of the 
total financial exposure of a recovery strategy (i.e. 
limiting total loss) rather than truly incentivising and 
promoting adaptive behaviour. Insurers have been slow to 
encourage the uptake of resilience and mitigation 
measures as in the past they did not see their role as a 
promoter of safety and equally they were concerned 
about a potential negative financial impact on their profits 
[23]. 
Ultimately there is also the need to consider the role, 
scope and priorities of insurers. The benefits of risk 
reduction when insurance has state involvement are clear, 
however for private companies, the benefits of 
incentivising risk reduction are more complicated. There 
may be some reasons for private insurers to encourage 
individuals to reduce their flood risk as they will reduce 
any damages and claims paid in the event of a claim.  
However, if insurers are able to effectively price risk and 
have adequate numbers of households buying insurance 
and are underwritten by reinsurance, then they may be 
reluctant to involve themselves in something which is 
external to the key role of private insurance companies 
which is to provide cover at a profit to their shareholders. 
It is important to be mindful of the agendas and priorities 
of private insurance companies when considering how 
best to incentivise individual risk-reduction.  
Furthermore, we also    
preferences for risk reduction. Amongst private insurers 
there appears to be a preference for government-led or 
community scale risk reduction measures or the use of 
development control, above the adoption of individual 
mitigation measures or resilience. There is often the 
perception amongst insurers that these measures are 
much more effective than household-scale resilience and 
because they will be installed and maintained by 
authorities they are therefore more likely to reduce risk 
than other measures. They may be more likely to offer a 
reduction in premium when the risk-reduction action is 
something permanent (e.g. raising the floor level) 
whereby any reduction in the risk will continue to be 
effective over the long term. Achieving an appropriate 


    !
management, yet also allowing the insurance market to 
work effectively in incentivising risk-reduction behaviour 
is difficult and complex; not least since ultimately 
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insurers would prefer governments to invest public 
monies in risk reduction 
There is a growing wealth of literature about the 
motivations and decision processes of selecting and 
implementing household risk reduction measures and 
how these could be promoted [25-29]. From the 
		  	 
 
  
significant barriers to action. Until these are addressed 
merely increasing the burden on those affected by flood 
risk or removing the ability of a community or individual 
from financially recovering from flood risk appears 
largely insufficient to promote and incentivise adaptive 
behaviour. There may be a number of reasons for this 
failing, including: 
 A general lack of awareness and/or understanding of 
their flood risk and the scale of any potential impacts; 
 Householders lack the awareness that their insurance 
policy or a compensation scheme does not fully cover 
them from loss and therefore they are not aware that 
they might need to reduce their risk; 
 A lack of awareness of the potential options to reduce 
risk and their effectiveness [30]; 
 Lack of knowledge on available measures for flood 
proofing existing buildings, and how these should be 
taken into account in premium calculations [25, 31]; 
 An inability to understand the trade-off in terms of 
availability/affordability of insurance and the cost of 
the mitigation measures [13, 30]; 
 Incentives, such as premium reductions, for 
implementing individual scale measures remain 
insufficient and are not guaranteed [32, 33]. 
 
All of these are barriers to the uptake of mitigation 
measures and each will need different strategies to tackle 
them. However, if the level or type of incentive is 
appropriate and sufficient then it is more likely that there 
will be motivation for any other barriers also to be 
overcome. From a private market insurance perspective 
the more effective mechanisms as part of the private 
market relate to availability and affordability of cover.  
The lack of compulsion to have insurance is one key 
factor inhibiting the promotion of adaptation. There is 
much more scope for individual mitigation measures in 
the case of price-reflective premiums and a lack of uptake 
is partly due to the fact that there are very few situations 
where sufficiently high premiums are charged and flood 
insurance is a compulsory peril. Therefore, those who are 
unable to afford insurance are just not buying it, rather 
than reducing their risk (and premiums) or by making 
their properties more resilient to flooding. There are also 
a very large number of insurance schemes whereby 
premiums are offered at a flat-rate and therefore the scope 
in which to incentivise mitigation in this way, by 
reducing premiums, is limited.  
Insurance systems where there is more government 
involvement may have more opportunities to add special 
conditions on the insurance in order to compel 
policyholders to take measures. However, similar to the 
private market where insurance is not compulsory and/or 
widespread it will be difficult to influence resilience to 
flooding on a large scale. 
Despite the opportunities and the high potential for 
insurance to impact on mitigation, to date the outcomes 
appear disappointing. Insurers could be doing more to 
encourage the uptake of measures through clear premium 
or deductible incentives [25]. However, they are also well 
placed to offer information about those measures that 
might be taken to increase the resilience of a dwelling as 
they will have contact with policyholders at least on a 
yearly basis
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